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In the new world financial, economic and nowadays debt crisis, the role of international 
organizations is in focus again. The financial crisis opens the way for IMF credits and for 
thinking in the European Union. After the second millenary, a scientific dispute started about 
the credibility of the Washington Consensus in many parts of the world. A new school emerged 
around Bruno S. Sergi, Roberto Tamborini, and William T. Bagatelas, who has been speaking 
about a transition from Washington consensus towards Brussels consensus in the case of 
Eastern European countries. Sergi carefully and precisely calls for specific and active state 
directed policy that puts economic transition in Europe in a new dimension. By Bagatelas, 
specifically, under the EU dimension, development under the new "Brussels Consensus” 
consists of activist state policies based upon assumptions given the world by Keynes, 
Schumpeter and supply side beliefs. Empirical studies also proved this structural break in 
macroeconomic policy. Now, the debate on appropriate economic policy is very active again. 
As in times of recession, Keynes and Keynesian economics has become popular, but the role of 
the state (and the international organizations) is sorely ambiguous. Our paper is to compare the 
Washington and the Brussels consensus from a heterodox point of view, and to find the 
differences of the two conceptions. Finally, we sketch the controversial concept of Beijing 
Consensus. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When Williamson first mentioned the so-called ’Washington consensus’, he could not 
think this concept launch a branch of articles with different consensuses and an 
important debate will start about the existence of them. During Eastern European 
transition, at the moment of the inauguration of the euro, and since the breakout of the 
current credit crisis, some concepts are highlighted. From Washington through Brussels 
and Frankfurt to Beijing, a series of centers of the economic policy stands for 
consensuses. 
2. THE THREE FAMOUS CONSENSUS  
2.1. The Washington Consensus 
The Washington Consensus (WC) was first mentioned by John Williamson (1989) to 
describe a set of ten specific economic policy prescriptions for developing world. It 
acquires the ‘one size fits all’ rule of the International Monetary Fund of those ages. 
Serra et al (2008) retrospect WC as a consensus for liberalization and globalization 
rather than a consensus for equitable growth and sustainable development. 
The consensus as originally stated by Williamson included ten broad sets of relatively 
specific policy recommendations. However, the literature (including Williamson’s later 
work) quotes Williamson’s original paper in many ways (see Birdsall et al, 2010, 
Williamson, 1989, Williamson, 1993, Williamson, 2008). Here, we list the original 
headings of the Williamson speech, with his later explanations and re-explanations. 
1. Fiscal deficits – fiscal policy discipline, with avoidance of large fiscal deficits 
relative to GDP (Budget deficits – properly measured to include local 
governments, state enterprises, and the central bank – should be small enough to 
be financed without recourse to the inflation tax.); 
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2. Public Expenditure Priorities – redirection of public spending from 
subsidies toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services 
like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment (Public 
spending should move away from politically popular but economically 
unwarranted projects (bloated bureaucracies, indiscriminate subsidies, white 
elephants) and towards neglected fields with high economic returns and the 
potential to improve income distribution (primary health and education, 
infrastructure); 
3. Tax reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates 
(To improve incentives and horizontal equity, the tax base should be broad and 
marginal tax rates moderate. Taxing interest on assets held abroad (flight capital) 
should become a priority in the medium term.); 
4. Interest rates dictated by market forces – Positive Real Interest Rates 
(Ultimately, interest rates should be market determined. As this could be 
destabilizing in an environment of weak confidence, policy should have more 
modest objectives for the transition, mainly to abolish preferential interest rates 
for privileged borrowers and achieve a moderately positive real interest rate.); 
5. Competitive exchange rates (Countries need a unified (at least for trade 
transactions) exchange rate set at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a 
rapid growth in non-traditional exports, and managed so as to assure exporters 
that this competitiveness will be maintained in the future.); 
6. Trade liberalization: liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on 
elimination of tariffs (Quantitative trade restrictions should be replaced by 
tariffs, and these should be progressively reduced until a uniform low tariff in 
the range of 10 percent is achieved.); 
7. Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment (Barriers impeding foreign 
direct investment and the entry of foreign firms should be abolished; foreign and 
domestic firms should be allowed to compete on equal terms.); 
8. Privatization of state enterprises (State enterprises should be privatized); 
9. Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer 
protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions 
(Governments should abolish regulations that impede the entry of new firms or 
restrict competition, and ensure that all regulations are justified by such criteria 
as safety, environmental protection, or prudential supervision of financial 
institutions.); 
10. Legal security for property rights (The legal system should provide secure 
property rights without excessive costs, and make these available to the informal 
sector.). 
 
In a book edited with Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski in 2003, Williamson laid out an expanded 
reform agenda, emphasizing crisis-proofing of economies, "second-generation" reforms, 
and policies addressing inequality and social issues. Dani Rodrik (2006) refers this list 
as ’augmented Washington Consensus’. 
1. Corporate governance 
2. Anti-corruption 
3. Flexible labor markets 
4. WTO agreements 
5. Financial codes and standards 
6. Prudent capital-account opening 
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7. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
9. Social safety nets 
10. Targeted poverty reduction 
 
Kanbur (2008) emphasizes that challenges to the consensus emerged in the moment 
when it was formulated. By the end of the 1990’s, more and more critical papers were 
published about the WC. Clift (2003) thinks beyond the Consensus with heavy sarcasm 
towards Williamson’s Washington Consensus II. The status of the debate in 2005 is 
finely summarized by Gnos and Rochon (2005). The strong skepticism can be described 
well by the expression ’Washington Confusion’, first appeared in 1999 (Naim, 1999) 
and rehashed by Rodrik (2006): ”… nobody really believes in the Washington 
Consensus anymore. The question now is not whether the Washington Consensus is 
dead or alive; it is what will replace it.” In his famous speech in 2009, Gordon Brown 
said ”… the Washington Consensus is over”. 
In 2008, the consensus about the death of Washington Consensus was built, as Stiglitz 
(2008) or Estevadeordal-Taylor (2008) demonstrated. Moreover, Stiglitz thinks that the 
future of a uniform economic policy toolpack is dubious, as ”… there is no… Post-
Washington Consensus consensus”.  
2.2. The Brussels Consensus 
Meanwhile in Brussels, the European Union, and distinguished the European Monetary 
Union (theoretically based on Mundell’s theory on optimal currency areas) is built on 
the Washington Consensus. The common monetary policy of European Central Bank, 
and the theoretically independent fiscal policy restricted by the Maastricht treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the small and inflexible EU budget, and overall the 
often lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy, and between fiscal 
policy across countries (Farina-Ricciuti, 2007, Pisani-Ferry, 2010) conduce to the 
introduction of Brussels Consensus. As many publications (see Bagatelas, 2004, 
Tamborini, 2003, Irvin, 2005) suggest, instead of Latin-American and Eastern European 
countries, the main user of the Washington Consensus is the EU. Fitoussi and Saraceno 
(2004) dare to call it as ’Washington-Frankfurt-Brussels Consensus’. We finished our 
previous chapter with the consensus on the end of the Washington Consensus, but what 
about European Union? Is it also over? 
The Brussels Consensus has some successes and failures in the pre-crisis period. We 
can see (De Grauwe, 2006, Farina-Ricciuti, 2007, Le Cacheux-Saraceno, 2007, Perry-
Servén, 2008, Tamborini, 2002) that the monetary policy had a relatively good 
performance (stable and low inflation rate), but the growth and fiscal policy goals are 
not reached (Jones, 2007). Even the European Union is split; the euro zone members 
had much lower growth performance than non-euro zone union members (also before 
the first wave of accession of Eastern European countries). The rules of the European 
Monetary Union are also very soft. At the moment of the birth of euro, only 5 of 12 euro 
zone members fulfilled the government debt criterion, and the average government debt 
/ GDP ratio was always over 70% (it should not exceed 60% in all countries). 
2.3. The Beijing Consensus 
Ramo (2004) argues that the success of China (and also other BRIC countries) 
contradicts every single principle formulated in the Washington Consensus. He forms 3 
guidelines of this policy mix, under the name of Beijing Consensus (BC): 
• Innovation and constant experimentation; 
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• Rejection of GDP growth above all in favor of sustainability and equality; 
• Self-determination  
 
The BC is formed, merely, around three ideas, which are in themselves less tangible and 
more subjective then those of the WC. (Turin, 2010) Although ambitious, the original 
conception of the BC is not up to the task of being a worthwhile competitor to the 
alternative model from which its name was coined, not because of the WC's apparent 
worthiness, but rather because the BC is a misguided and inaccurate summary of 
China's actual reform experience. (Kennedy, 2010) 
 
To be more precise, in his January 2012 article in Williamson (2012) describes the 
Beijing Consensus as consisting of five points:  
1. Incremental Reform (as opposed to a Big Bang approach),  
2. Innovation and Experimentation,  
3. Export Led Growth,  
4. State Capitalism (as opposed to Socialist Planning or Free Market Capitalism).  
5. Authoritarianism (as opposed to Democracy or Autocracy). 
 
Li et al (2009b) argue that even though there are some problems in Ramo's original 
definition of Beijing Consensus, it should not be rejected altogether. In Li et al (2009b) 
10 principles of the BC can be found as:  
1. Localization of best practices borrowed 
2. Combination of market and plan 
3. Flexible means to a common end 
4. Policy rights 
5. Stable political environment 
6. Self-reliance 
7. Constantly upgrading industry 
8. Indigenous innovation 
9. Prudent financial liberalization 
10. Economic growth for social harmony 
 
Chinese government officials and academics themselves have embraced some of the 
main claims in the Beijing Consensus. In particular, they have embraced the idea that 
Chinese growth is driven by economic statism—that is, the state exerting extensive 
control over the economy—rather than by the vibrancy of the market and influential 
private entrepreneurship. (Huang, 2011) Leonard (2006) also argues that the concept of 
the Beijing Consensus is soft; one can find different interpretations and lists of its 
elements. Lee and Mathews (2008) try to widen the concept towards a Far East 
perspective, by defining the Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo Consensus: 
 
A. Two Agents 
• Private Firms (PF) and Pilot Developmental Agency (G) 
B. Processes for Capability Building (PF + G) 
• Arranging accesses for external knowledge 
• Export-based engagement with global economy for disciplinary learning 
• Targeting import-substituting technologies/sectors 
• Sequential upgrading for dynamic comparative advantages 
C. External Environment for Capacity building (G) 
• Generic human capital enhancement 
• Catch-up friendly financial system 
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• Macroeconomic stability 
• Phasing out of non-market interventions 
 
In Kolodko’s opinion (Kolodko, 2012), the economic development strategy shouldn’t 
rely on “Beijing Consensus”, nor the already compromised “Washington Consensus”. It 
must be crafted from something in between. He offers a new pragmatism based on 
country’s specific factors. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The European economic policy applied until the deepening of the current crisis leads to 
government debt in long term and results great growth losses for all Europe. The 
institutional frame of the EU – implemented along the Washington Consensus – seems 
to fail its macroeconomic goals, as generates low growth rates and growing government 
debt. In 2012, some positive changes (new pacts) started, but we cannot be sure how 
these paper tigers will be implemented. We do not think that a worldwide Beijing-type 
consensus would be the solution for the problems of the world economy, but shifting 
towards an economic view described in the measure of Gross National Happiness is not 
inconceivable. Since the break-away of European debt crisis, forces towards self-
determination and economic (or political economic) individualism has been 
strengthened. Emphasizing sustainability and equality in times of no growth is not fair 
policy. 
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